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Although there is consistent evidence for a deficit in the manipulation and 
internal representation of space and spatially located objects by the congenitally blind 
(e.g. Heller, 1989), explanations for this deficit are disputed.  In this chapter, two 
accounts are examined for their ability to explain the experimental data, and recent data 
from a comparison of blind and sighted participants’ judgements of, and memory for, 
relative object locations are described, in an attempt to discriminate between these two 
accounts.   
Blind People’s Visuo-Spatial Performance 
 Blind and sighted comparisons have been made on a wide variety of visuo – 
spatial tasks (e.g., those involving mental rotation, mental scanning, pathway memory 
and word imagery), always with the same result: the blind group performs either less 
accurately or more slowly than the sighted control group.  However, the surprising 
finding has been the similar patterns of performance that are demonstrated by both 
sighted participants and the congenitally blind on such tasks.  These patterns of results 
have lead some researchers to suggest that the blind and sighted utilise similar mental 
representations.  Given this assumption, the blind visuo-spatial performance deficit must 
be explained by less efficient processing of the representations. This is a processing 
account of the blind visuo-spatial deficit.  Most perceptual data used by the blind are 
received and processed sequentially (e.g. haptic and audio information) whereas visual 
                                                 
1 Supported by the Royal National Institute for the Blind. 
data are received and processed in parallel.  It has been concluded by some researchers, 
therefore, that deficits arise because serial processing of sound and touch is slower and 
more prone to error than the parallel processing of vision (e.g. Aleman, van Lee, 
Mantione, Verkoijen & de Haan, 2001). However, there are a priori reasons to believe 
that differences between blind and sighted visuo-spatial performance may reflect 
different or impaired mental representations rather than less efficient processing.  The 
argument goes as follows: Mental representations are required for visuo-spatial tasks 
and are derived from perceptions; the perceptual experience of someone blind from birth 
must be different to that of a sighted person; it follows that the mental representations of 
the blind might be profoundly different from those of the sighted.  It can then be 
hypothesised that mental representations based on haptics or auditory perception might 
be sub-optimal for visuo-spatial tasks, so explaining the consistent performance deficit 
on such tasks by the congenitally blind. 
In summary, the conflict within the literature has been between those who 
propose processing deficiencies in the blind in relation to the stages of constructing, 
integrating and manipulating visuo-spatial representations, and those who emphasise 
differences in the actual format of such representations. 
The Representation Account 
Representational explanations of blind people’s visuo-spatial deficit vary widely.  
Perhaps the most extreme version of the representation account holds that the blind use 
‘abstract semantic representations’ (Zimler & Keenan, 1983) whereas the sighted use 
analogue visuo-spatial representations.  This claim is based upon evidence that the blind 
demonstrate the same advantage for concrete, imageable words (e.g., “puppy”) over 
abstract and non-imageable words  (e.g., “bonus”) as the sighted do. 
Zimler and Keenan argued that in the blind the advantage for high-imageability words 
was not due to visual imagery (as has been argued for the sighted) and therefore must 
reflect the operation of an effective  non-imagery representation based upon 
propositional encoding of abstract semantic information. However, the contrasting 
conclusion, that imagery representations rely very little on vision and are cross-modal, 
has also been drawn from the same evidence (De Beni & Cornoldi, 1988). 
 The assumption that the blind use abstract semantic representations in visuo-
spatial tasks has not been supported by evidence of blind performance at tasks that are 
widely held to involve analogue representations, such as mental rotation.  Mental 
rotation tasks typically require participants to encode an object, and then recognise 
whether another object is the same or different in shape, under conditions of rotation or 
reflection.  One study compared mental rotation of tactually presented forms by blind 
and sighted groups (Marmor & Zaback, 1976).  All participants demonstrated longer 
reaction times for larger rotation angles, in common with previous rotation research 
(e.g. Shepard & Metzler, 1971). Moreover, all groups showed evidence of employing an 
analogue representation, because of the clear linearity evident in the increase in 
response times in proportion to increases in the angle of rotation.  However, although 
this appears to be indicative of an analogue representation, it has been argued by 
Anderson (e.g., 1978) that evidence from rotation studies may be consistent with 
propositionally-based abstract semantic representations. Marmor and Zaback (1976) 
also found evidence of a blind visuo-spatial deficit, with the congenitally blind group 
being significantly slower and making more errors than both late blind and sighted 
groups.  The authors’ claim was not that blind participants employed a propositional 
rather than analogue representation;  instead they made the weaker and more ambiguous 
claim that the better performance in rotation tasks by sighted people was because 
”mental rotation is easier to perform upon visual representations than non-visual ones” 
(1976, p.520). Nonetheless, the implication is that blind and sighted participants have 
qualitatively different representations (i.e. visual and non-visual).  However, this 
account has limited explanatory power, and typically leads to a circular argument - those 
without vision perform worse because their representations lack a visual component, 
and the lack of a visual component is found in those without vision. 
 An alternative representational hypothesis has been proposed by Heller (1989), 
who asserted that blind people’s visuo-spatial representations differ from sighted 
people’s because the blind lack experience of external frame or reference cues (e.g. 
knowledge of the horizontal and vertical) and that these aid in the construction of a 
more manipulable object-centred representation. (Rock & DiVita, 1987).  This claim 
was supported by evidence of less accurate recognition of rotated unfamiliar stimuli by 
the early blind and also by sighted groups who had frame of reference cues removed, 
compared to sighted participants with frame of reference cues available. The similar 
performance of both the congenitally blind group and the sighted group without frame 
of references cues suggests that they are accessing the same representational substrate, 
but it is simply incomplete.    
 Millar (1976) used a rotated drawing task and found that that the totally blind 
participants were worse than the sighted at oblique rotations but not at orthogonal ones 
(e.g. 900 and 1800 rotations).  She also suggested that congenital blindness reduces 
access to frame of reference cues and that the representations of the congenitally blind 
have less well-specified frames of reference than the sighted.   
The Processing Account 
 Processing and representation accounts are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  
However, processing accounts propose that the majority of evidence for blind visuo-
spatial performance deficits is the result of deficits in the processes of constructing, 
updating, and manipulating a representation, not of deficits in the form of the 
representation itself 
 One possibility is that the blind might have difficulty in initially coding the 
spatial form of an unfamiliar object of the type used in tactual mental rotation tasks.  
This would result in slower and less accurate performance in visuo-spatial tasks, 
particularly those tasks with objects irrelevant to the everyday experience of blind 
people.  An example of this would be slower blind performance in a mental rotation task 
of an unusual tactual form (Marmor & Zaback, 1976).  However, once the object is 
successfully recoded (with the additional time and loss in information that this might 
involve), the representation would be manipulated in the same way as a sighted person’s 
representation and so a similar pattern of performance would be demonstrated.  This 
account, therefore, cannot readily explain why there is no difference between blind and 
sighted performance at zero degrees of rotation (Heller, 1989), nor why there are larger 
blind and sighted performance differences at oblique angles of rotation (Millar, 1976). 
Finally, this account does not explain why the blind are no different to the sighted in the 
recall of concrete, imageable words (e.g. ‘dragon’) which presumably also require 
recoding. 
 An alternative account is that the blind have a lower capacity for all ‘active’ 
visuo-spatial processing (Vecchi, 1998).  ‘Active’ processing includes encoding, 
updating and manipulating visuo-spatial objects, but is separate from the ‘passive’ 
process of maintaining a representation, once encoded.  This processing-capacity 
account can explain much of the previous data very simply.  Word imagery similarities 
are explained as a result of similar, passively held representations, whilst mental rotation 
differences are explained as a result of increasing amounts of manipulation required at 
larger angles, which would slow down blind performance.  Underlying this account is 
the view that the visuo-spatial processing capacity of congenitally-blind participants is 
lower than that of sighted participants. This hypothesis was tested in a simultaneous 
comparison of active and passive visuo-spatial memory with blind and sighted groups 
(Vecchi, 1998).  In the experiment, participants tactually explored a matrix of wooden 
cubes (three cubes long by three cubes wide, or on harder trials a three-dimensional 
array).  Some of the cubes were marked by a coarse surface, and the participants were 
instructed to remember their positions (passive memory).  The participants were then 
asked to imagine a pathway through the matrix (e.g, “now move left one cube, up one 
cube, forward one cube…”) which entails active memory-updating. The participants 
were tested on their memory for the coarse-surfaced cubes and for the final cube in the 
pathway.  Although the blind were worse than sighted controls at both tasks, they were 
significantly less accurate at the more difficult, three dimensional, active pathway recall.  
This is consistent with the predictions of the processing-capacity theory.  Both types of 
recall require some processing but the pathway tasks require more and so increase the 
deficit observed with the blind, especially on the harder trials.  Blind participants’ visuo-
spatial processing capacity can cope with easier, two-dimensional matrices, but is 
insufficient for three-dimensional ones. 
Accounting for the Evidence 
 The processing-capacity hypothesis explains word imagery and mental rotation 
effects, but it does not readily explain Millar’s (1976) finding of worse rotation abilities 
at oblique angles nor Heller’s (1989) evidence of comparably worse rotation abilities 
among sighted participants with frame of reference cues removed.  However, the 
representational accounts cannot easily explain the pathway memory findings of Vecchi 
(1998).  The differences found between two and three dimensional pathway memory 
could be explained as an informational difference; the addition of another dimension 
may require greater specification and so representational accounts would predict 
reduced accuracy with an added dimension.  However, this difference should also 
extend to memory for fixed  passive object locations.  The same informational 
requirements must be represented and no account based on representation seems able to 
explain this difference. In summary, the blind may use abstract semantic 
representations, but there is also evidence for both a difference in represented frame of 
reference information and a difference in processing efficiency.  The issue for blind 
research is which of these accounts underlies the majority of performance differences 
between congenitally blind and sighted groups. 
Recent Research into Visuo-Spatial Processing with a Different Paradigm 
 Some of our own recent research has examined evidence for the nature of mental 
representations and the processes carried out upon them in congenitally blind people.  
Our research is based upon previous investigations of the use of analogue versus 
propositional representations among the sighted (Mani & Johnson-Laird, 1982; Baguley 
& Payne, 2000).  Examination of underlying representations is problematic. Indeed, as 
we noted earlier, some have argued that arbitrating between propositional and analogue 
accounts of representation is impossible because performance in any task can be 
explained with equal plausibility in terms of either of these formats (Anderson, 1978).  
Others have argued that performance advantages can accrue from using analogical 
representations that would not be found if representations were propositional.   For 
example,  mental models theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983) offers a detailed theoretical 
account of the analogical representation of spatial descriptions.  Evidence for this 
account has demonstrated a difference between propositional representations, which can 
represent unspecified (indeterminate) relations (e.g., “besides”), and analogue 
representations, which reflect specific (determinate) relations, and so must represent 
each possibility (in this case ‘to the left of’ and ‘to the right of’).  The consequence of 
this is that propositional representations are equally efficient at maintaining 
indeterminate and determinate information, whereas analogue representations maintain 
determinate information better than indeterminate.   
Researchers have found an advantage for determinate stimuli in sighted people 
consistent with an analogue representational account of spatial description (Mani & 
Johnson-Laird, 1982).  A development of this experimental paradigm was used by 
Payne (1993; see also Baguley & Payne, 2000) to demonstrate that, not only do 
participants remember analogue representations, they also have a memory trace for the 
construction of the ‘mental model’.  This additional representation contains information 
on the processes of model construction.  The memory trace can be defined 
propositionally, and contains information on the starting state of the representation, the 
relationship of ‘new’ information to already held information, and therefore the order in 
which the mental model is constructed.  As a result it is sensitive to the order of the 
spatial descriptions.  Evidence in support of the so-called ‘Episodic Construction Trace’ 
has demonstrated reduced recognition of reordered spatial descriptions compared to 
originally-ordered spatial descriptions. 
 In our recent research this paradigm was adjusted to be accessible for blind 
participants (for a more detailed account, see Fleming, Ormerod, Collins & Ball, 2002). 
Determinate and indeterminate descriptions of the spatial relations of five objects in two 
dimensions were presented to congenitally blind participants, and their performance was 
compared with blindfold sighted participants and also with sighted controls.  The 
participants first had to judge whether a presented tactual diagram was a correct layout 
of the described objects, or whether it was a different layout of the same objects.  A 
surprise recognition task was then given to participants, in which four alternative 
versions of each original description had to be ranked for similarity to the original: the 
original (same-ordered/reordered), an alternative description of the correct layout, and 
two distractor descriptions.  Gist recognition was measured as a participant correctly 
ranking the two correct layout descriptions as first and second. Using this measure, 
determinate descriptions were correctly recognised more often than indeterminate 
descriptions, F (1, 42) = 10.07, p < 0.05.  This supports the hypothesis that visuo-spatial 
representation among all participant groups is analogue.  There was no effect of group 
(F < 1), which, suggests a functional equivalence in blind and sighted representation of 
relative object location on this task. Original description recognition, which was 
measured as the proportion of responses in which the original sentence was ranked first, 
differed significantly across groups, F (2,42) = 5.55, p < 0.01.  Planned comparisons 
showed that the congenitally blind group recognised fewer original sentences than either 
the blindfolded or the seeing sighted groups, F (1,42) = 7.95, p < 0.01.  There was no 
difference between the seeing and blindfolded groups (F (1, 42) = 2.97, p > 0.05.    
The blind participants’ poor performance at recognition of original descriptions 
in our experiment  contrasts with evidence reported in the literature on verbal memory, 
which typically shows that the blind have superior verbal memory to sighted controls 
(Hull & Mason, 1995; Röder, Rosler & Neville, 2001).  The congenitally blind 
participants in our study also achieved significantly higher digit spans than sighted 
controls, so it seems unlikely that the worse memory for the original descriptions was 
due to worse verbal memory in the blind. Instead, this finding probably reflects worse 
memory of mental model construction (the Episodic Construction Trace). This memory 
trace includes the start position of the mental model and the order in which it is built up; 
information that is manifested in memory for the original description.  Worse blind 
performance at trace recognition of the model building process supports the processing 
account hypothesis that blind processing is more limited. 
A key element of this paradigm was the opportunity to discriminate between 
analogue and propositional representations.  Participants had to demonstrate 
understanding of the layout of the objects described to them by recognising two 
different descriptions of the same objects.  Blind performance was consistent with the 
analogue representations of the sighted and not with the deployment of abstract 
semantic representations. Furthermore, in contrast to previous research, blind and 
sighted memory for object layout was equally accurate.   
Two accounts of blind visuo-spatial performance deficits have been considered 
in this chapter: differences in representation, and differences in processing. 
Representational accounts do not predict the functional equivalence found in the study 
reported by Fleming et al. (2002). We suggest that there is little evidence for the blind 
relying upon a different (abstract and propositional) representation of visuo-spatial 
information to sighted people.  Both blind and sighted representations of spatial 
information appear to be analogue, and both groups are equally effective at retaining  
‘gist’ information about the analogue forms they represent.   
Instead, evidence has been presented suggesting that most blind visuo-spatial 
deficits are the result of processing differences between the sighted and the blind. Our 
results are more consistent with work that suggests the blind are equally able to 
remember spatial patterns when they are engaged in a task that does not require their 
manipulation or elaboration through active processing (Vecchi, 1998).  However, the 
results raise the question of whether it is a deficiency in processing capacity. In our 
study, blind participants were equally effective as sighted participants in diagram 
judgement and memory for gist representation, yet sighted participants were not at 
ceiling in either measure.  This suggests that the tasks exceed visuo-spatial processing 
capacity for all participants. Thus, a deficit in capacity should have resulted in impaired 
performance for blind participants on these measures as well as on the original 
description recognition measure. 
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